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The Takeaway © Mosbacher Institute 
Money plays a big role in US politics. There are two primary 
ways of amassing political influence: donations to cam-
paigns and political action committees (PACs) and lobbying. 
With no limits on lobbying expenditures, this activity has his-
torically garnered the largest spending. In today’s markets, 
firms cannot be successful without considering their political 
environment. Because of this, competitive market behavior 
and political rent-seeking (like lobbying) have become stra-
tegic complements, and firms redistribute their spending 
across market and political activities based on which arena 
offers the best chance at increasing revenues. 
Lobbying is defined as “the transfer of information in private 
meetings and venues between interest groups and politicians, 
their staffs, and agents.”1 Thus, successful lobbying depends on 
delivering a persuasive message. Firms hire lobbyists to craft 
and deliver such messages, and the best lobbyists (those well-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Lobbying is an important 
complement to firms’ market 
activities. 
Large firms with more resources 
tend to lobby more, amassing 
significant political influence. 
Smaller firms and those with 
limited resources also find a 
way to lobby when the stakes 
are particularly high. 
Firms compete in both the 
economic and political markets. 
Firms' market behavior is 
shaped by their political 
environment. 
2 connected to politicians2), are naturally expen-
sive. As a result, the larger and wealthier the 
firm, the more likely it is to lobby.3 Despite the 
high cost, firms with limited resources find 
ways to engage in lobbying as well. They do so 
by pooling their limited resources via trade 
associations and by organizing sporadic con-
certed lobbying campaigns when the stakes 
are particularly high. Below we offer descrip-
tive case studies of agricultural and energy 
firms to illustrate how market conditions af-
fect firms’ political strategies.  
ENERGY 
The energy industry offers clear examples of 
the heterogeneity in political strategy. Oil and 
gas companies lobby all the time. They tend to 
be large firms and they can use their natural 
resource base to secure financing. Renewable 
energy producers, by contrast, have less cash 
to invest in activities like lobbying because 
they do not own the inputs they use to produce 
energy. As a result, renewable producers en-
gage in sporadic targeted lobbying efforts, of-
ten under the umbrella of an industry trade 
association. This difference is illustrated by the 
lobbying frequencies in Table 1. Between 1999 
and 2019, publicly traded oil and gas compa-
nies filed about as many reports, on average, 
as there are disclosure periods in a year. Pub-
licly traded solar firms, however, filed fewer 
reports than the number of reporting periods.  
Renewable companies have not been profita-
ble on their own until recently, so they have 
faced strong incentives to lobby, despite hav-
ing few resources. In 1990, small solar and ge-
othermal companies successfully lobbied to 
eliminate size restrictions on generating facili-
ties that qualified for preferential treatment 
under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA)—1978 legislation that aimed to 
promote renewable generation and energy 
conservation.4  
Large electric utilities had long considered 
some PURPA requirements unfavorable. Regu-
lated utilities are allowed to earn profits only 
on their investments in physical infrastructure 
(e.g., building new power plants). PURPA, how-
ever, requires utilities to purchase renewable 
generation from small independent facilities at 
prices set by the state. This limits utilities’ abil-
ity to invest in generating infrastructure and 
thus reduces their profits. So utilities face in-
centives to lobby against such requirements. 
Over time, as the cost of renewables fell, utili-
ties faced a more competitive market environ-
ment and increased their lobbying efforts to 
weaken what they considered to be expensive 
PURPA requirements. As a result, in 2015, 
three Congressional lawmakers requested that 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) reexamine PURPA,5 and in 2020, FERC 
introduced amendments that appeared con-
sistent with utilities’ interests and that the re-
newable industry promptly challenged in 
court. 
Between 1999 and 2017 Congress legislated 
twelve Acts that included provisions for re-
newable energy tax credits. The tax credits 
were temporary and faced expirations every 



























































Note: Averages are based only on publicly traded compa-
nies and exclude lobbying by private firms and industry/
trade associations. Source: author calculations using Lob-
bying Disclosure Act (LDA) reports. 
  Oil & Gas  Solar  
1999-2007 (semi-annual reporting) 1.8  0.3  
2008-2019 (quarterly reporting)  4.4  2.6  
Table 1: Average number of lobbying reports, 
per firm per year  
after the expiration of tax subsidies, solar and 
wind firms lobbied intensively before expira-
tions and were successful in getting the credits 
renewed, in some cases retroactively. 
AGRICULTURE 
6 
Farming tends to have inelastic supply—
farmers cannot quickly alter supply in re-
sponse to a change in demand. This means that 
producers must absorb the adjustment costs if 
commodity prices decrease.7 This vulnerability 
incentivizes agricultural producers to secure 
protection through political means, including 
lobbying.8 Between 2009 and 2019, the US 
economy experienced one of the longest peri-
ods of economic expansion. The ag sector, 
however, saw a period of low prices between 
2013 and 2017. Figure 1 shows how the down-
turn affected lobbying incentives. Among the 
publicly traded agricultural companies repre-
sented in the data, before the fall in crop pric-
es, there was a positive relationship between 
lobbying and profitability. During the period of 
low prices that relationship flipped. Those 
with negative profitability lobbied, while those 
that earned positive profits did not lobby. 
Firms that faced difficulties in the competitive 
market turned to the political process for re-
lief. This was not the case in industries that did 
not face a downturn. Figure 2 shows that be-
tween 2009 and 2019, lobbyers in most other 
industries were more profitable, on average, 
than their non-lobbying peers. 
To better understand the incentives involved, 
consider the types of policies for which agri-
cultural firms and farmers lobby.9 The US farm 
bills have typically included direct payments, 
price supports, loans, and other policies that 
either raise market prices of agricultural com-
modities or raise farm incomes through gov-
ernment purchases above market prices. So 
the lower the profits, the greater the incentive 




























































Figure 1: Agricultural profitability, by year and 
lobbying status, 2009-2019 
Source for figures: Authors’ calculations using Lobbying 
Disclosure Act (LDA) reports and Compustat data.  
Note: Horizontal bars represent each industry’s average 
profitability during time periods when the industry lob-
bied and did not lobby. Only publicly traded companies 
are represented, due to availability of financial data. Prof-
itability is calculated as EBITDA/assets. 
Figure 2: Average industry profitability by lob-
bying status, 2009-2019 
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difficult for firms to remain profitable by producing 
and selling those commodities, so firms, unions, and 
cooperatives step up their lobbying efforts.10 
Agricultural subsidies have persisted largely be-
cause of the industry’s engagement in lobbying. Ag 
entities lobbied to widely expand producer protec-
tions under the 2008 Farm Bill, write additional 
commodity subsidies and crop insurance programs 
into the 2014 Farm Bill, and to extend these protec-
tions in the 2018 Farm Bill. The 2008 effort was par-
ticularly fruitful, as it increased crop subsidies and 
expanded other benefits to farmers “at a time of 
high food prices and record farm income.”11 Firms 
spent an estimated $173.5 million lobbying for this 
bill; hiring former congress members and staffers to 
petition on their behalf.12 In May of 2008, President 
Bush vetoed the bill on the grounds of its fiscal irre-
sponsibility, but after the bill returned to Congress, 
the House and Senate overrode the presidential veto 
by sizable margins (316-108 in the House and 82-13 
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